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Be N i A,--- C
A Country Profile
During the December Summit of the Americas, Chile was formally invited to become
the fourth member of the NAFTA by the heads of state and governments of the three
founding countries of the treaty.1 Since then, Chile's functional status as a country has been
subject to intense scrutiny, the results of which have been overwhelmingly favorable. What
follows is a brief sketch of Chile's most notable features, many of which became critical fac-
tors in the decisive move to make Chile the first additional country to be considered for
NAFTA membership.
I. The Current Administration
On March 14, 1994, Chile's current President, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, a member of
the Christian Democrat Party (PDC), was inaugurated. President Frei has set the tone for
his new eight-year-long administration. 2 His proposed focus was modernization, with par-
ticular emphasis on improvements in education, infrastructure, production and market-
oriented economic policies.3 In addition, President Frei launched a new mechanism for
"overhauling the civil service as part of an ongoing anti-corruption drive. 4
. President Frei's continuous focus on fostering a healthy export-oriented economy for
Chile has led to unprecedented economic progress. 5 Such dramatic success becomes partic-
ularly admirable when Chile's present status is contrasted to the lesser-developed economies
of other states which have, similarly to Chile, recently returned to democracy after enduring
years of dictatorship. 6 Indeed, Chileans have endured political oppression for 17 years
under an extremist right-wing military regime under Pinochet.7 Since civilian rule was
restored in 1990, however, Chile has become unstoppable in its move towards its continued
multifaceted development. 8
II. Financial System
One mark of Chile's relative economic maturity is its financial system, which has "the
most advanced capital market and the highest savings rate in Latin America."9 The central
1. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Finance Foreign Ministries Resolve Dispute Over NAFTA
Negotiations (Jan. 31, 1995), available on LEXIS.
2. Walden Publishing Ltd., Country Reports: Chile, p. 3 (Jan. 30, 1995).
3. Id-at 3.
4. Id. at 3.
5. Id.at 4.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id. at 4.
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id.at 11.
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bank, Banco Central de Chile, is "the supreme monetary authority."'10 It regulates the
money supply, exchange rates and interest rates and sets the fiscal monetary and exchange
rate policy. 1 The activities of Chilean banks and private financial houses (financieras) are
under the supervision and control of the Superintendencia de Bancos y Instituciones
Financieras (SBIF). 12 Once authorized by the SBIF, foreign banks may also operate in Chile
through locally-established corporations, branches or representative offices.13
III. Economic Management: Implications for Foreign Investors
Chile's government is known for its concentration on monetary, fiscal and exchange
rate policies. 14 While Chilean foreign investment regulations are relatively liberal, the Banco
Central de Chile and the Comite de Inversiones Extranjeras (CIE) will nonetheless examine
foreign investment over US$ 5 million. 15 Foreign investors have the benefit of enjoying vir-
tual "national treatment" (having the same rights and obligations as nationals, except for
access to local credit), and there is neither a limit as to foreign percentages of ownership in
local private enterprises nor a maximum amount of time that foreign investment may
remain in Chile. 16 In addition, although special permission is required for foreign invest-
ment in the news media and other public services, there are no sectors in the Chilean econ-
omy that are specifically reserved for Chilean investors. 17
Because the Chilean peso can only fluctuate 10 percent on either side of a "reference
rate" (which is calculated using an index of currencies, including the U.S. dollar, the
Japanese yen and the German deutschemark), the Chilean government has allowed the peso
to appreciate against the dollar, thus permitting inexpensive imports to compete with
domestic products and prices. 18 However, these policies have resulted in a novel problem
for the Chilean government: instead of having to attract dollars, the country finds itself with
an "ever-growing queue of would-be investors:"19
Even though one of Chile's laws requires foreign investment to remain within Chile for
at least 12 months, Chile's recent economic and political stability continues to attract a
steady stream of foreign investment. 20 In 1994, direct foreign investment rose by 60 percent
to US$ 2.2 billion and thus contributed to an amazing trade balance of US$ 400 million
surplus by December 1994.21 The largest foreign investor in 1994 continued to be the
United States (having US$ 979.23 million worth of investment), with Canada and Mexico
10. Id at 12.
11. Id at 12.
12. Id. at 12.
13. Id at 12.
14. Id at 11.
15. Id. at 16.
16. Id. at 16.
17. Id at 16.
18. Id.at 12.
19. Id. at 12.
20. Id. at 4.
21. Id. at 4.
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following closely behind in ranking. 22 Chile's economic achievements are characterized by
Economy Minister Alvaro Garcia as currently generating one-third of all Chilean exports. 23
Minister Garcia is fully convinced that since "practically all economic growth stems from
the export sector ... foreign investment is making a very significant contribution to
growth' 24
IV Negotiations with MERCOSUR
In addition to its pro-active efforts in attracting foreign investors to its own economy,
the Chilean government is also seeking to expand its trade arena by conducting negotia-
tions with other trade blocs. Indeed, Chile was recently described as being "among the
fastest-growing foreign investors in other parts of Latin America." 2 5 In a recent meeting of
Chilean trade officials with representatives from the Southern Cone Common Market
(MERCOSUR), June 30, 1995 was set as the date on which both negotiatin parties would
agree on a timetable for the reduction of MERCOSUR tariffs with Chile.26Although as a
future member of the NAFTA Chile "could not become a full member of a separate customs
union, a free trade agreement between Chile and [MERCOSUR1 would nevertheless be fea-
sible."27 The eventual implementation of such a tariff-reduction program is one which
promises to be mutually beneficial. In addition, Chile's participation in the MERCOSUR
will only work toward accelerating the overall hemispheric trade integration process in the
Americas. 28
V Moving Towards Full Membership in the NAFTA
Although there are some anti-NAFTA sentiments on the part of Chilean environmen-
talists and labor leaders, the majority of Chilean bankers and financial services groups
eagerly await the positive effects that NAFTA accession is likely to have on Chile.2 9 Indeed,
leaders from export-based industries maintain that Chile's membership in the NAFTA "will
stamp Chilean goods 'quality-assured" prompting greater sales in markets outside the
NAFTA zone."3 0 The tourism and transportation sectors are expected to benefit from
increased business and tourist travel revenues, while the obvious "domino effects" will like-
wise occur in other parts of the economy. 3 1




26. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Chile and Brazil State "Firm Decision" on Chile's Association
with Mercosur (Mar. 6, 1995), available on LEXIS.
27. Walden Publishing Ltd., supra note 2.
28. 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 1 at 17 (Jan. 4, 1995).




However, in lieu of the economic crisis in Mexico, general concerns have arisen with
respect to the extent that it will affect Chile's progress towards becoming a full member of
the NAFTA. Chilean Finance Minister Eduardo Aninat recognized that the Mexican crisis
could delay the Chilean entry into the NAFTA. Nevertheless, Minister Aninat stated that
such a delay might even favor Chile "as it would then have more time to prepare itself and
to respond under better conditions'to the future challenge' of joining NAFTA."'3 2 Perhaps a
more pending issue is the Summit of the Americas' specific intent to achieve hemispheric
integration by the year 2005, a feat which requires the current NAFTA members to look
beyond Mexico's economic crisis in order to successfully continue the "ongoing process of
hemispheric integration.' 33
Although the devaluation of the Mexican peso may lead to some decrease in foreign
investor confidence across Latin America, Chile's strong economy, stable currency, and
commitment to continued economic growth are critical factors that will in all likelihood
ensure Chile a smooth welcoming into the NAFTA. 34 Indeed, while U.S. Trade
Representative Mickey Kantor has warned that caution must be taken throughout the acces-
sion process because of its precedential value to future prospective NAFTA members, he has
also urged that the process continue as scheduled. 35 Hence, in February 1995 representa-
tives from the three NAFTA signatories-have already met for the second time in Mexico City
in an attempt to work out some of the "modalities" for Chile's entry into the NAFTA. 36 In
addition, the NAFTA signatories agreed at the Summit of the Americas that "a ministerial
meeting would take place in May with full accession negotiations beginning shortly there-
after"37W
Thus, as U.S. Congressional "fast-track" authority needs to be renewed for future trade
agreements, including Chile's accession to NAFTA, a Congressional vote is expected to
resolve the issue of whether to grant that authority later this year.38 Under "fast-track"
authority, "bills implementing international trade agreements are not amendable once they
have been introduced. Before introduction, however, the administration and Congress work
together on developing the legislative language in 'mock mark ups' of the draft legisla-
tion?" 39 On April 6, 1995, Senate Finance International Trade Subcommittee Chairman
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) asserted with confidence that Congress would pass fast-track
authority for Chile's membership to the NAFTA "if the issue did not get bogged down with
32. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Regional Political Reaction: Chilean Finance Minister
Reassures Investors; Crisis Not to Stop NAFTA Talks (Jan. 17, 1995), available on LEXIS.
33. 12 Int'l-Trade Rep.(BNA), No. 3 at 111 (Jan. 18, 1995).
34. BNA Int'l Trade Daily, Chile: Grassley Confident on Chile Fast-Track if Labor and Environment are
Kept Out (Apr. 7, 1995), available on LEXIS. 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), supra note 33.
35. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, supra note 32. See also 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 50 at
1957 (Dec. 21, 1994).
36. BNA International Trade Daily, USTR Official Hopes Chile Talks on NAFTA Can Be Concluded in
1995 (Mar. 8, 1995), available on LEXIS. 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 9 at 421 (Mar. 1, 1995).
37. 12 Int'l Trade Reporter (BNA), No. 12 at 550 (Mar. 22, 1995). The Christian Science Monitor,
Assessing the Consequences of the Peso Crisis (Mar. 23, 1995), available on LEXIS.
38. Supra note 37. BNA Int'l Trade Daily, supra note 34.
39. Id.
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labor and environmental considerations."40 Representative Kantor, on the other hand,
noted that it would be "'strange and asymmetrical' for Chile to be allowed to join NAFTA
without having to sign labor and environmental agreements similar to ones signed by
Mexico' 4
1
Whether or not fast-track authority is approved for Chile's accession into the NAFTA
becomes a mere side issue given that Chile's "enormously impressive economy" is assurance
enough of Chile's NAFTA membership.42 From a hemispheric perspective, there is no
doubt that Chile's inclusion in the NAFTA will put additional pressure on the other nations
of the Caribbean, South and Central America to facilitate the opening of their markets.
-Laura C. Reyes M.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), supra note 35.
